The aim of this article is to demonstrate the usefulness of taking into account the variable of EU institutional development when analysing the consequences of EU membership. Using an historical institutionalist perspective, the article examines the path of the Council Presidency since its origins and argues that five decades of institutional feedback have unexpectedly altered its nature. Originally conceived as an intergovernmental function, today the Presidency has become hybrid and increasingly identified with the Community interests. This process of institutional conversion has essentially limited the scope of action of the member states.
Introduction

1
Just over fifty years ago, six European states decided to embark on a common venture. In a Europe divided by the Iron Curtain, they chose to unite and to create a new kind of political organisation. The aim of this article is to improve the understanding of this atypical political system. It is an exercise to further understand the relationship between structure and agency within the European Union, and, in particular the structuring effect of the institutions on political actions. In this sense, the intention is to contribute to the academic debate on the implications of EU membership. The starting hypothesis lies in the claim that the evolution of the institutional system constitutes a variable with explanatory power that should be taken into account when analysing the consequences for states of being members of the EU. Researching the changes that the EU imposes on national executives involves focussing attention on the functioning of this political structure as well as considering its ever changing nature.
I. Why the EU Council Presidency?
In order to illustrate this idea, the case of the EU Council Presidency will be considered. The main reason to study it is related to a recurring debate in progress since the seventies regarding the scope of this function for the member states. The qualitative leap in the roles of the Presidency over the years has led various authors to question the implications of the exercise of the Presidency for member states that for six months on a periodic and rotational basis occupy this post. Starting from the analysis of the role of 2 the Presidency in terms of organisation, impulsion, mediation and representation both within and outside the Union, several authors have tried to establish the level of responsibility and/or political opportunity that the exercise of this function implies (Bengtsson et al., 2004; Edwards and Wallace, 1976; Elgström, 2003 , Tallberg, 2006 Thomson, 2008) .
Three principal hypotheses have been formulated regarding this particular aspect. One part of the literature considers that the holding of the Presidency represents a great responsibility that does not however bring about any political power for the state concerned (Bassompierre, 1988; Dewost, 1984; Metcalfe, 1988; O'Nuallain, 1985) .
From this perspective, the Presidency is a supranational function that involves placing national administrations at the service of the Union and subordinating the pursuit of national interests to that of common interest. Seen in this light, the Presidency is essentially a neutral and impartial role that prohibits political capitalisation, except for the prestige obtained as a result of a job well done.
Another body of literature argues the contrary: that the Presidency is essentially an intergovernmental function (Ayral, 1975; Tallberg 2003 and Sherrington, 2000) . From this perspective, the holding of the Presidency places the member states in a privileged position that allows them to guide the European agenda and to maximise their own interests. This second hypothesis that is anchored into a rationalist theoretical framework, questions the disinterested nature of the Presidency and highlights the level of discretional power inherent to its exercise.
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In contrast to these two principal approaches that highlight respectively the 'silencer or amplifier' character of the Presidency (Bengtsson et al., 2004) , a third line of interpretation has emerged. This vision nuances the previous views and sustains that the presidential role combines both communitarian and intergovernmental components (Kirchner, 1992; Ludlow, 1993; Wallace, 1986; Westlake, 1999; Schout, 1998) .
According to this vision, the Presidency is a complex role in which responsibility and opportunity are present at the same time. As the prominent figure within the Council, and therefore as one of the main bridges between the supranational and intergovernmental dimensions of the Union, the Presidency implies a balancing act between the individual interests of national government and the general interests of the Community.
This debate regarding the dilemma of the Presidency in terms of representation of interests is particularly interesting. Nevertheless, the approach used by scholars to contrast these suppositions is not completely satisfactory. The usual approach to determine the competing or complementary expectations that arise from the tenure of the Presidency consists in analysing the current competencies of this institution.
Existing studies centre the subject of the Presidency from the perspective of the power given to the member states and, in this way, focus on the mechanisms at the disposal of the Presidency to influence the European agenda (see Tallberg, 2006) . This type of perspective, while useful, fails to address two previous and interrelated questions that are fundamental if we are to gauge the nature of this impact.
In the first instance, what is the relative position occupied by the Council Presidency within the European institutional system? Secondly, to what extent this rank has been 4 stable over time? In other words, how can we resolve the question of the implications of the Presidency for the agents of the political system in terms of representation of interests without establishing the scope of this institution within the overall system and considering the fact that the relative position of this institution has changed throughout the years?
To sum up then, the main problem of the existing analyses resides in the static conception of the structure-agency relationship. While considerable efforts have been spent in scrutinizing the semesters and in comparing national performances (e.g. Elgström, 2003; Quaglia and Moxon-Browne, 2006; Svensson, 2000) , little attention has been paid to the institutional variation of the Presidency over time. The evolution of the Presidency is mentioned but institutional change as an explanatory factor of the actual scope of this function for the member states -the level of responsibility and/or opportunity that its exercise involves-is not considered. Taking this into account, this article claims for the need to situate the study of the structure-agency relationship within an historical perspective in order to fully understand the impact of the Presidency on the member states. More specifically, it argues that if there is no doubt that the presidential term of office constitutes an especially relevant moment in terms of the interaction between the European and the national spheres, it should however be stated that its effects have not always been the same. The scope of the Presidency for the member states has varied in function of the evolving position of this institution within the European system.
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II .The EU Council Presidency from the perspective of historical institutionalism: a win-win exercise
The basic hypothesis is that the Council Presidency is not a constant variable.
Five decades of institutional feedback have unexpectedly altered its nature and this process of institutional conversion has locked in the scope of action of the member states. In 1951, the Presidency had a low-profile, intergovernmental function. Its competences were limited and were basically administrative in nature. The functioning of the erstwhile Special Council of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was simple, with little formal organisation. In this context, the Presidency had a mostly symbolic importance for the member states. The presidential mandate did not involve either a great deal of responsibility or major organisational efforts, although on the other hand, it did provide a mechanism to ensure equal representation within the Council.
Fifty years later, things have changed. Five decades of institutional increasing return effects have considerably upgraded this institution and led to its progressive communitarisation. This office no longer represents a mere administrative role identified with the defence of intergovernmental interests. It has become a complex exercise that is increasingly associated with the defence of community interests.
Historical institutionalism is the approach used to confirm this hypothesis.
The usefulness of this theory lies fundamentally in the theoretical importance attributed to the time factor, and, more specifically, to the historical trajectory of institutional options (e.g. Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Pierson, 2004) . This school of neo-institutionalism accepts the realist premise that the 6 starting point of institutional design is the rational choice of political actors, and proceeds to research the long-terms effects of the initial decision, stressing the contingent nature of such effects. From this approach, current political outcomes should be interpreted in the light of past institutional choices (Bulmer, 1994; Krasner, 1984 and Thelen, 2003) . The actors that create the institutions are, at the same time, conditioned by the development of the institutions themselves. The main feature of this evolution is its continuity or path dependency. The greater the time elapsed, the greater the difficulty involved in going back to the original choices and implementing alternative solutions, even if they are more efficient (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985) . The amortization of the initial investment, the experience acquired and the co-ordination with other institutions all produce inertias (Pierson, 1993) . In this context, changes with regards to the original model tend to be limited and set in a pre-established pattern of development.
However, institutions do undergo substantial changes. To explain this, historical institutionalism uses the term of 'critical juncture', a concept that is similar to the 'performance crisis' coined by March and Olsen in 1989 , and is based on the idea of turning point in the development of a system. Profound changes are not frequent, while the catalyst is to be found in the socio-political environment and takes the form of an event that is at once exceptional and crucial, with the result that the foundations are laid for a new path to be established (March and Olsen, 1984, 1989) . Such a change in direction may involve the creation of norms and procedures that break, to a greater or lesser degree, with the institutional legacy of the past. The institutional transformation may be complete or partial, but it will contribute to the development of new models of representation and behaviour.
Overall, by situating the structure-agency relationship in a dynamic and diachronic perspective, historical institutionalism allows us to shed light on the mechanisms of innovation, reproduction and institutional change as well as to make clear the impact of this evolution on the behaviour of political actors (Steinmo et al., 1992) . In other words, the analytical importance attributed to the structure-agency dialectic over time allows us to sequentialize institutional development and to examine the evolution of the structuring effect of the institutions on political action. In this sense, it helps to show the long-term implications of institutional decisions.
In the case of the Council Presidency, this approach is interesting because it allows us to trace the path of this institution since its creation; to identify the key moments that have marked its development; and to highlight both the role played by the member states in driving this process of change and its lock-in effect regarding the definition of future actions.
The EU Council Presidency: Analysis of a changing nature
Today, the Presidency continues to represent the main intergovernmental counterweight to the supranational dynamic embodied by the European Commission.
Nevertheless, this institution has also become one of the driving forces of the European integration process, namely, an institution increasingly associated with the defence of collective views and the implementation of common policies. This unexpected change that may be described as the "communitarisation" of the Council Presidency can be explained by the institutional choices made by the member states at decisive moments of European construction.
The creation of the Council Presidency as an intergovernmental guarantee
The origin of the EU Council Presidency should be placed in the context of the political negotiations that presided over the creation of the first European Community.
In 1951, the main concern of the founder states was centred on the autonomy of the High Authority (Dinan, 2004, p.51; Houben, 1964) . The idea contemplated in the Schuman Declaration to create a supranational institution that would be independent of national governments caused misgivings among the contracting parties and in particular among the Benelux States who would finally condition their participation in the European project to the creation of a Council of Ministers that would institutionalise member state participation in the Community structure (Poidevin and Spierenburg, 1993, p.13; Rittberger, 2001, p.695) . This was the source of a hybrid political system based on the principle of institutional balance. The power of the High Authority, the forum of the representation of the general interest of the Community, was counterbalanced by the creation of a Special Council of Ministers, a body of collective control and centre of member-state interests (De Visscher, 1957, p.23; Kersten, 1988, p.293) .
The Presidency of the EU Council finds its origins in this context characterised by the will to organise the conditions of state participation in the communitarian enterprise. Its beginnings were modest in terms of competencies but important from a 9 symbolic and political point of view. Effectively, the Presidency was then designed as a double institutional guarantee. On the one hand, it represented governmental interests within the communitarian structure, which at that time allowed for the powerful figure of Jean Monnet, first president of the High Authority, to be counterbalanced. On the other hand, it also guaranteed the equal representation of the member states within the Council (Dumoulin, 1988, p.272) . The conditions regarding how the Presidency would be attributed and exercised could be summed up in terms of two key principles: representation and equality. Both were set out in Art. 27 of the Treaty of the ECSC and were considered to be, until recently, non-negotiable by the small states of the Union.
This system, whose precedent was Art.IV of the Internal Rules of Procedure of the Council of the League of Nations of 1933, involved two ideas. Firstly, the fact that the Presidency would be assumed by the member states and not by a collective representative. Secondly, the idea that each member state would exercise this function periodically on a rotating basis, regardless of its demographic size or economic and political power (Di Bucci, 1988, p.5) . During this first stage, the rotation sequence was fixed by the alphabetic order of the member states in the French language 2 . By choosing an institutional design based on the principles of representativeness and equality, the founding states ensured a national profile for the Presidency, in contrast to the communitarian profile of the Presidency of the High Authority. This was also foreseen by the Treaties of Rome 3 , and was reinforced during the shift to intergovernmentalism in the 1960s. proposals, negotiate and find formulae of consensus in the intergovernmental domain (De Schoutheete, 1980, p.43) .
In this sense, the creation of the European Council in December 1974 should also be highlighted. The institutionalisation of the Conferences of Heads of States and
Governments that had taken place without a fixed timetable since 1961 endowed the European building with a superstructure (Brückner, 1982, p.60; Bulmer and Wessels, 1987 
The conversion of the Council Presidency: the communitarisation of an intergovernmental function
For decades, the Presidency was essentially conceived as an intergovernmental counterweight to the supranational dynamic embodied by the European Commission.
As Wallace pointed out, the design of the EC rested on an institutional balance between two levels of governance -the Community with the Commission, advocate of collective interests, and the national with the Council -and thus the Presidency-forum of the member states (Wallace, 2002, p.328) . conditioned to a large extent to the capacity of the President to construct a majority (Tallberg, 2006, p.60; Westlake, 1999, p. 43) .
The Responsibility for assuring coherence between economic integration and political union
Finally here, a third element should be highlighted that contributed to the strengthening of the centrality of the Presidency at the heart of the European institutional system, and that also supports the hypothesis that the Presidency has increasingly taken on board supranational interests: the institutionalisation of its link between the two functional dynamics of the EU. Until the SEA was passed, the Council
Presidency constituted an informal bridge between the process towards economic integration taking place within the three European Communities, and the mechanism of Political Co-operation based on intergovernmentalism, which remained outside the legal framework of the Treaties. On granting a single framework to these two dimensions of As Johan Olsen has claimed, the debate on the future of Europe has always been above all a debate on how Europe should be governed, how the powers of the principal communitarian institutions should be organised, distributed, executed and controlled in the widened political arena (Olsen, 2002, p.922) . This process of reflection and negotiation on the levels of the respective powers and on the rules of the European political game has lasted for nearly a decade. During all of these years, one of the most interesting and controversial questions that has arisen has been the reform of the rotational presidential system. than half a century, the presidential mandate is no longer a role of administrative manager and spokesman of state interests in the heart of the Community, but rather has become a complex role of drive, coordination, negotiation, mediation and representation both in the supranational and intergovernmental areas of the Union.
This evolution has transformed the meaning of the Presidency for the member states. In functional terms, the increasing importance of the role of the Presidency since the seventies has been matched by the increase in the responsibilities of the member states both inside and outside the Union, which means that the challenge also increases for the administrations involved. On a politically symbolic level, the evolutionary dynamic of the Presidency has contributed to partially detach this figure from its founding logic related to the conflictive dialectic between the Council and the Commission. The presidential mandate has become a complex balancing challenge based on the compatibility of interests and the sum of identities. Proof of this is that, today, the main success of a Presidency does not derive form the capacity to slow down the European construction process, but rather from efforts to motivate and achieve progress.
Conclusion
In this article, the objective has been to demonstrate the relevance of placing the analysis of the structure-agencies relationship in a historical perspective and to validate the idea that the evolution of the institutional system constitutes an explanatory variable to bear in mind when analysing the implications of EU membership. To test this hypothesis, attention has centred on the Council Presidency. This case study illustrates the evolving character of the European institutions, the role assumed by the member states in driving this process of change and also its lock-in effect regarding the definition of future actions. The aim was to demonstrate that the significance of the Presidency for the member states has varied throughout the process of European integration in accordance with the transformation of this institution and that such transformation has been driven by the institutional decisions taken by the member states at critical points in the history of European construction.
Once this has been done, a conclusion has been reached that, indeed, the implications of hosting the Presidency have not always been the same. In 1951, the Presidency had an intergovernmental function with a low political profile. The ambits were limited and were essentially administrative. In the image of the then Special
Council, the way of working was simple and its organisation reduced to the minimum.
In this context, the scope of the Presidency for the Member states was above all of a symbolic nature. This presidential mandate involved neither a great deal of responsibility nor major organisational efforts, although, on the other hand, it did provide a mechanism to ensure equal representation within the Council. 
